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Introduction 
At our time, such words as crisis and recession 
have become a part of our day-to-day vocabulary. 
According to the research conducted by Deutsche 
Bank in 2017, the frequency of financial crises has 
increased. It makes us wonder whether we are able 
learn from our mistakes and slow down the rate of the 
economic downfalls. The interest of the academia is 
riveted on the Great Depression of 1929-1939 and the 
global financial crisis of 2008-2009; however, the 
economic catastrophes between these two events are 
not studied as thoroughly, and the 1980s’ Savings and 
Loan Crisis falls into that category. 
It can be inferred from its name that the Savings 
and Loan debacle involved the crash of the Savings 
and Loan market. One hundred years ago, the U.S. 
banking system was reluctant to finance common citi-
zens with home mortgages. Under the force of high 
demand for affordable home ownership, the savings 
and loan associations, called thrifts, were established 
in the 1930s (Metaxas & Trompatzi, 2015). The thrifts 
were allowed to receive deposits and grant loans, 
mostly home mortgages, to the local residents. The 
deposits were insured by the U.S. government, and in 
return, the thrifts were obliged to invest at least 65% 
of their assets into the residential mortgages. Moreo-
ver, the mortgage interest was capped in order to make 
home ownership affordable to common people (Jang, 
2015). Such an advantageous symbiosis became ex-
tremely popular making thrifts a significant part of the 
U.S. financial industry. That is why the crisis had se-
rious consequences on the whole financial system – it 
cost $160 billion to the U.S. economy (Pusey, 2017). 
T. Metaxas and G. Trompatzi (2015) regard “the 
structural problems of the industry, the imprudent ac-
tions of the policy decision makers and the imperfect 
and restrictive regulatory environment of the financial 
sector in general” to be the main causes of the Savings 
and Loan crisis. B. Jang (2015) lists more distinct 
causes: 
1.  Economic circumstances. The U.S. govern-
ment increased interest rates in order to beat the infla-
tion of the 1970s. Investors realised it was more prof-
itable to keep their money in banks or in money mar-
ket mutual funds (MMMFs), so the thrifts had to in-
crease their deposit interest rate in turn. As the mort-
gage interest rates were capped, the thrifts experienced 
an imbalance between the interest receivable and the 
interest payable.  
2.  Deregulation. In the 1980s, in attempt to solve 
thrifts’ problems, the U.S government decided to ease 
the regulations. In particular, the capital requirement 
was decreased from five to four and then to three per-
cent, the accounting rules were changed in favour of 
showing no longer existing assets on the balance 
sheets, the investment in riskier assets was allowed; 
the requirements for a number of total shareholders, 
the share of local resident shareholders, and the cap 
for percentage of share per shareholder were abol-
ished. 
3.  Increased deposit insurance. As the deposits 
were insured by the U.S. government up to $100,000 
in the 1980s instead of the earlier $40,000, the thrifts 
engaged themselves in high-risk and high-return in-
vestments. 
4.  Moral hazard. The deregulation allowed the 
thrifts to engage in riskier or even illegal activities, 
and increased deposit insurance kept them safe from 
supervisory bodies. A. Pusey provides an illustrative 
example of Empire, “the first-ever savings institution 
closed due to fraud” (2017). 
5.  Delayed policy and mergers. Instead of closing 
the insolvent thrifts, the U.S. Government decided to 
merge them with prime institutions, which worsened 
the situation (Jang, 2015). 
Although the importance of all the above causes 
is indisputable, T. Metaxas and G. Trompatzi (2015) 
found an intense disagreement in the academic litera-
ture over whether too loose or too restrictive regula-
tions were the main cause of the crisis. We attempt to 
have a closer look at the U.S. regulations, related to 
that subject. The purpose of this article is to produce a 
review of scientific research, conducted on the Sav-
ings and Loan crisis within the last 8 years, and from 
the distance of almost three decades to: 
1.  Identify key role players from the inception to 
the demise of the Savings and Loan market. 
2.  Analyse shortfalls of the regulation which af-
fected the Savings and Loan market. 
3.  Make an argument for which level of regula-
tion the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act 
was. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as fol-
lows. Section 2 presents the methodology. Section 3 
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identifies key role players from the inception to the 
demise of the Savings and Loan market. Section 4 
analyses shortfalls of the regulation which affected the 
Savings and Loan market. Section 5 makes an argu-
ment for which level of regulation the Garn-St. 
Germain Depository Institutions Act was. The last 
section summarizes the findings and states the conclu-
sion. 
Methodology 
The analysis is exploratory in nature and is based 
on an extensive review of earlier relevant studies on 
the various aspects of the Savings and Loan crisis and 
its interrelation with markets regulations. The basis of 
the analysis is a collection of articles, published in 
credible scientific journals within the last 8 years. 
Key role players from the inception to the de-
mise of the Savings and Loan market 
The Savings and Loan market was regulated by a 
number of organisations. In the U.S.A., the Federal 
Reserve System (FRS), responsible for regulatory and 
monetary policies, supervises the Federal Reserve 
Banks (FRB), which perform the last resort function 
to all the other financial institutions in the U.S.A. Un-
der the Federal Mortgage Banking Act of 1932, the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) was estab-
lished to insure the functioning of the savings and loan 
mechanisms with a reserve system. In 1934, the Fed-
eral Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) 
was established for the thrift industry under the Na-
tional Housing Act. The FSLIC encouraged the issu-
ance of long-term, fixed-rate mortgages (LTFRM). 
The Interest Rate Control Act (IRCA) of 1966 author-
ised the FHLBB to establish interest-rate ceilings for 
the thrifts that were 25 basis points higher than those 
for commercial banks under the condition that the 
thrifts invested a large part of their assets in mortgages 
(Steinreich & Oglesby, 2016).  
T. Metaxas and G. Trompatzi (2015) distinguish 
three main players, responsible for the inception of the 
crisis:  
1) the U.S. Federal Reserve Banks, which al-
lowed double-digit inflation, and hence, higher nomi-
nal interest rates; 
2) the U.S. Congress and Council, who ignored 
the increase of interest rates; 
3) the FHLBB, which ignored high risk opera-
tions in the industry. 
The researchers note that the regulatory authori-
ties were disjoined in their functions, could not coop-
erate, and thus, no one had sole responsibility for the 
crisis (Metaxas & Trompatzi, 2015). B. Jang (2015) 
specifies that it was the Reagan administration that 
“eased the regulatory environment on the thrift indus-
try by lessening the size of regulatory agencies and by 
reducing intervention on the industry”. 
As the crisis became obvious, the U.S. Govern-
ment took steps to overcome it with the creation of 
new acts. Under the Financial Institutions Reform, 
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) 
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Im-
provement Act of 1991 (FDICIA), the regulatory sys-
tem of the Savings and Loan market was reorganised. 
The FHLBB was substituted with the Office of Thrift 
Supervision (OTS), and the FSLIC was abolished in 
favour of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC), who became responsible for the newly creat-
ed Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) and the Sav-
ings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF) (Jang, 2015). 
As we can see, many organizations played a sig-
nificant role in the inception to the demise of the Sav-
ings and Loan market. However, the main decision 
makers, who defined the direction of development of 
the market and the strategy of beating the crisis, in our 
opinion, had always been the U.S. Presidents and the 
U.S. Congress, who alone had the power to abolish 
old regulators, create new ones and issue restrictive or 
liberal legislation, regulating the market. Moreover, 
they alone had a bigger picture of the state economy, 
which all the established regulatory authorities, de-
scribed above, had the information and the influence 
within their limited scope (that is within the Savings 
and Loan market only). 
Shortfalls of the regulation that affected the 
Savings and Loan market 
We distinguish three phases of the Savings and 
Loan market regulation: Restrictive I, Liberal and Re-
strictive II, presented on Figure 1.  
The first phase is known for the boom of the Sav-
ings and Loan industry. Federal Mortgage Banking 
Act of 1932, National Housing Act of 1934 and Inter-
est Rate Control Act of 1966 restricted the activities of 
the thrifts and insured them to the point that the indus-
try became perceived as risk-free. Such a regulation 
was beneficial in the static conditions of the post-
Great Depression period. However, with the develop-
ment of financial markets, the overregulated thrifts 
lost their competitiveness to the Money Market Mutu-
al Funds (MMMFs), established in the 1970s. Thus, in 
the first phase of 1930s-1970s the Savings and Loan 
Market suffered from the overregulation, and as a re-
sult by 1980, 330 thrifts had problems and 11 failed 
(Steinreich & Oglesby, 2016). 
The second phase is characterised by the attempt 
of the U.S. Government to fix the Savings and Loan 
Market’s growing problems by deregulation. In the 
1980s, at the peak of the confrontation of Capitalism 
and Socialism, the U.S. politicians were reluctant of 
imposing further regulations on the Savings and Loan 
industry in fear that their actions could be viewed as 
pro-socialist. At the same time, their strong belief in 
Adams’ invisible hand of free market lead them to the 
idea of market deregulation. During the first phase the 
risk-averse restrictions of the thrifts’ activities were 
balanced with the insurance, adequate to the risk. 
However, as the second phase deregulation has lifted 
the restrictions, increasing the risk, the insurance of 
deposits was also increased. This move of regulatory 
authorities does not seem logical: the thrifts were pri-
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vate entities, and as the risks grew the government 
should not insure such risks without getting anything 
in return. As a result, the thrifts indulged themselves 
into high-risk high-return investments, and the gov-
ernment had to pay for the risks in the case of failure. 
T. Metaxas and G. Trompatzi (2015) state that the 
monitoring system of the Savings and Loan market of 
that time “imposed a loose regulatory framework and 
also had flimsy foundations.” 
The Depository Institution Deregulation and 
Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA) was creat-
ed with intention to gradually eliminate the limitations 
on the interest rates payable on deposits and accounts, 
to increase loans and investments up to 20% of the 
thrifts’ assets, to allow such services as Negotiable 
order of Withdrawal checking accounts (NOW), trust 
activities, and credit cards (Jang, 2015). However, the 
invisible hand of the free market did not work, and by 
1982 the number of problem thrifts reached 744 with 
76 failures (Steinreich & Oglesby, 2016). 
The Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions 
Act of 1982 has given the thrifts even more power: it 
eliminated deposit rate ceilings, reduced required capi-
tal levels on the balance sheets and loosened re-
strictions on allowable business activities for the 
thrifts (Kao, 2011). The Garn–St Germain gave au-
thority to state-chartered thrifts to operate in the same 
way as the federally chartered ones (Jang, 2015). The 
elimination of the restrictions and the relaxation of the 
capital requirements allowed the thrifts to “operate 
with a high leverage ratio and generate extraordinary 
returns on capital” (Cassell, 2016). The deregulation 
did not help to improve the state of the Savings and 
Loan market, and the problem thrifts numbered 689 
with 54 failures in 1983 and 748 with 27 failures in 
1984. Tax Reform Act of 1986 reformed the taxation 
in the real-estate industry, adversely affecting the 
Savings and Loan market, so in 1986 there were 51 
failed thrifts, while in 1988 – 222 (Steinreich & 
Oglesby, 2016). This data clearly shows that the free 
market competition did not work out. We agree with 
M. Mitschow and M. Schinski, who think that “estab-
lishing special rules for certain economic players cre-
ates market distortions” (2011). Instead of favorable 
treatment, restrictive measures were required. 
The third phase of the Savings and Loan market 
regulation was restrictive. As it was mentioned in Sec-
tion 3, FIRREA of 1989 and FDICIA of 1991 reorgan-
ised the market completely by eliminating old regula-
tors and introducing new authorities. This time the 
restrictive policy worked to the benefit of the Savings 
and Loan market. The case of the Savings and Loan 
crisis demonstrates on practice the equal harm of over-
regulation and deregulation. State economy is a sensi-
tive area, which should not be run by such extreme 
flows like free market or pure socialism. Healthy 
economy requires the right amount of regulation, 
based on the fundamental knowledge of economics. 
Conclusion 
The conducted analysis of the recent research 
publications on the Savings and Loan crisis has shown 
that the key roles throughout the crisis were played by 
the U.S. Presidents, the U.S. Congress and the various 
government organizations, appointed to monitor the 
performance of the Savings and Loan market players. 
The crisis was initiated by the shortfalls of overregula-
tion and aggravated by the deregulation. The Garn-St. 
Germaine Depository Institutions Act is a bright ex-
ample of a direct domestic governmental industry-
specific regulation, relaxing the market restrictions 
without regard to the complexity and dynamics of the 
economy. We strongly believe that further study on 
the Savings and Loan Crisis can yield more important 




Fig. 1. Savings and Loan Market Regulation Phases 
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